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I. HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
The New Deal years witnessed an explosive growth in the size
and powers of the federal government as President Roosevelt proposed
a series of measures to lift the nation out of the grasp of the Great
Depression.' Many of these measures involved the creation of new
administrative agencies, each focused on a particular problem or facet
of the national economy. To many it seemed that overnight an alpha-
bet soup of "new instruments of public power" had emerged and
brought under federal regulation whole areas of the national life once
considered private and removed from the public sphere.2 Never
* Ph.D. in American History, State University of New York at Binghamton. Many people
have contributed to this Article. I would first like to thank the editors of the Seattle University Law
Review for guiding a first-time author through the publication process. I must also thank Daniel
Ernst, Christopher Tomlins, and Katherine Stone for the helpful comments and suggestions they
offered when I first presented this paper at the annual meeting of the American Society of Legal His-
torians in October 1998. The members of my dissertation committee, Melvyn Dubofsky, Brendan
McConville, and Sarah Elbert, also offered valuable insights and contributions to this Article.
1. See DAVID KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRES-
SION AND WAR, 1929-1945 (1999); WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND THE NEW DEAL (1963); ROBERT MCELVAINE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA,
1929-1941 (1984).
Most historians divide the New Deal into two distinct periods: the First New Deal, which is
usually seen as running from 1933 through 1934, and the Second New Deal, which begins in
1935. The programs passed during the First New Deal were primarily designed to provide
immediate unemployment relief, through programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corp, and
to bring industry together to help end the Depression. They were also aimed at lifting up the
nation's industrial and agricultural sectors through the NIRA and the AAA. The Second New
Deal is generally viewed as the more radical of the two as its programs were far more permanent
and far-reaching than those under the first New Deal. The National Labor Relations Act and
the Social Security Act were products of the Second New Deal.
2. See Hon. Joseph C. Hutcheson, New Instruments of Public Power or The Administro-
Judicial Process and the Struggle for the Supremacy of Law, Address at the Annual Meeting of
the State Bar of California 18 (Sept. 26, 1946) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
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before, except during times of war, had the federal government held or
exercised such broad and extensive powers.' By the middle of 1935,
federal administrative agencies were busily regulating nearly all facets
of the economy. The National Recovery Administration drew up
production codes for private corporations,4 the Civilian Conservation
Corps provided direct public relief and employment, the Tennessee
Valley Authority involved the federal government in regional eco-
nomic and social planning, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion brought under federal supervision the securities market.
Nothing, it appeared to the New Deal's critics, fell outside the scope
of federal authority as the new administration attempted to resuscitate
the moribund national economy.
The most significant federal agency born under the New Deal
came to life in July 1935 when President Roosevelt signed the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act (NLRA, or the Act), also called the Wagner
Act.' Never before in peacetime had the federal government decided
to so heavily regulate the private relationship between an employer
and his or her workers.6 On the surface, the Wagner Act simply
3. World War I was the last time the federal government played such an active role in
directing the national economy. For the most part, the wartime measures ended once the war
ended. See DAVID KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCI-
ETY (1980).
4. The National Recovery Administration was part of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, which was passed in 1933. It created a series of production codes for industry in an attempt
to bring order back to the industrial sector. The Supreme Court ruled the Act unconstitutional
in 1935. See A.L.R. Schechler Poultry v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
The Civilian Conservation Corps was established in March 1933 as the federal government's
primary unemployment relief program. It provided work for young men mainly on public
proj??ects such as road construction, conservation, and flood control. The Tennessee Valley
Authority was perhaps one of the most ambitious of the New Deal's programs. Established in
1933, the TVA undertook to revitalize the entire Tennessee River Valley through the
development of dams and industry and by providing relatively cheap electricity to the region.
5. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) [hereinafter NLRA]. There
are several published histories of the National Labor Relations Board. Irving Bernstein was one
of the first historians to examine the origins of New Deal labor policy and to examine the birth of
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. James Gross, however, provides a much more
detailed account of American labor policy in the New Deal years and focuses much attention on
the battles over the NLRA after its passage in 1935. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY (1950); 1 JAMES GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATION-
AL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW, 1933-
1937 (1974); and JAMES GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 1937-1947 (1981).
6. During WWI, the federal government forcefully entered the field of labor relations. As
wartime orders boosted the economy, the number of strikes began to rise, with over 4,400 in
1917 alone. To ensure that there were no interruptions in the production of wartime goods,
Woodrow Wilson established the National War Labor Board (NWLB) in April 1918, and
brought under government regulation and supervision the field of labor relations. For workers
and organized labor, the entrance of government into the labor relations process, for a change,
proved quite helpful. The NWLB forced employers to recognize and bargain with the chosen
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restated the labor provisions contained in the earlier National Indus-
trial Recovery Act, which also protected the rights of workers to
organize but had lacked the power to enforce those provisions.7 The
NLRA made illegal a whole host of employer actions designed to
block the organizational and unionizing efforts of their workers.' The
legislation also created a powerful agency with administrative and
adjudicative powers to enforce the Act's protections.9 Congress dele-
gated to the new National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, or the
Board), sweeping powers over the employment relationship. The
Board held the authority to charge employers with committing unfair
labor practices, conduct administrative trials against the employer, and
impose sanctions forbidding the employer from interfering with the
right of his or her workers to organize. The existence of the Board
challenged traditional managerial prerogatives in the workplace and
threatened to fundamentally transform the power relations between
workers and their employers.
representatives of their workers. For the first time, the government essentially declared that
workers had a right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. With the help of
the federal government, the organized labor movement gained over two million members during
the war years. Once the war was over, however, the federal government quickly dismantled the
wartime labor relations apparatus it had assembled and left workers to their own devices in their
postwar battles with employers. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MOD-
ERN AMERICA (1994); JOSEPH MCCARTIN, LABOR'S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS,
1912-1922 (1997).
7. See National Industrial Recovery Act § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (enacted 1933) [here-
inafter NIRA]. Section 7(a) of the NIRA, which used similar language as first written into the
Railway Labor Act of 1926 and the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, stated that
every code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued
under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) that employees shall have
the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization
or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be
required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from
joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing.
Id.
Unfortunately for labor, the Act did not contain any provisions for enforcement of these
protections if employers violated them. Enforcement depended upon the will of General Hugh
Johnson, the head of the National Recovery Administration, and President Roosevelt, neither of
whom appeared eager to make the protections embodied in section 7(a) real. See DUBOFSKY,
supra note 6, at 111-13.
8. Chapter 8 of the NLRA forbade employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." 29 U.S.C. § 201-19. Chapter 7
essentially restated the rights guaranteed to workers in Chapter 7(a) of the NIRA. 29 U.S.C. §
141-88; 15 U.S.C. §§ 701-02.
9. NLRA, supra note 5, at § 3(A).
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Looking back over the first ten years of the NLRA, Charles
Fahy, the Board's General Counsel from 1935 to 1941, reflected upon
the Board's close relationship with the lower federal courts.'" He
reminded his readers that "like most quasi-judicial agencies... and
perhaps to a greater extent than most, there are no powers which [the
Board] can exert unaided."" Therefore, he continued, a Board ruling
takes on the force of law only "until it becomes the order of a Circuit
Court of Appeals.' 1 2 Orders of the Board were not self-enforcing, and
the Board could not compel or force employers to obey its directives. 3
Thus, the Act itself gave the lower federal courts "a vital position in
the statutory" structure of the new labor legislation as the constitu-
tional body charged with enforcing decisions and orders of the
Board.' 4 Fahy recognized that the judges sitting on the federal court
benches, and not the Board, would "either make the Act work or
destroy it" through their powers of judicial review over Board deci-
sions."' This was true despite the legislative intent of the NLRA,
aggressive enforcement of the Act's protections by the Board, and
even public support for the new labor law.
Though the Wagner Act gave the NLRB the power to protect
workers' rights to organize, the Board nonetheless did not operate
completely independent of the other branches of government. The
Board was charged with enforcing the Act's provisions, as Charles
Fahy pointed out, but the federal circuit courts of appeals made the
Board's orders real. 6 The Act allowed employers to appeal NLRB
10. CHARLES FAHY, THE NRLB AND THE COURTS IN THE WAGNER ACT: AFTER
TEN YEARS (1945).
11. Id. at 43.
12. Id.
13. The NLRB's legal relationship with the circuit courts was modeled on that of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The bill's primary author,
Senator Wagner, referred to the Act's provisions of judicial review to counter the charge that the
proposed "Board is to be invested with extraordinary powers." Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm., 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (testimony of Senator
Robert F. Wagner).
14. FAHY, supra note 10, at 43.
15. Id. The judicial power to "either make the Act work or destroy it," as well as the rea-
sons for the Board's utter dependence on the judiciary for enforcement of its orders lie in the very
wording of the NLRA written and passed by Congress. Section 10(e) of the Wagner Act granted
to the Board the "power to petition any Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States ... where-
in the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts busi-
ness" for the enforcement of its orders. If an employer disregarded a Board decision, the Board,
then, had to seek judicial enforcement of that order by filing a petition of enforcement within
either the circuit court where the unfair labor practice occurred or where the employer transacted
business. Thus, the authors of the Act, though creating a quite powerful administrative agency,
nonetheless did not allow the Board to enforce its own decisions but rather it had to rely upon
judges sitting on the various circuit court benches.
16. FAHY, supra note 10.
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rulings directly to the nation's federal circuit courts of appeals.' 7 The
circuit courts also heard Board requests for enforcement of its deci-
sions against recalcitrant employers. 8  Through their powers of
review, circuit court judges were the first group of federal judges to
offer opinions on the Act's intent, rule upon its constitutionality, and
delineate the proper jurisdictional boundaries of the NLRB as an
agency with adjudicative and administrative powers. Thus, circuit
court judges played an important role in the construction of a new
body of national labor law around the legislative framework provided
by the Wagner Act.
The question of how to enforce the Act, as this essay will show,
varied among the various judges sitting on the federal court benches.
Often the choice in the federal circuit courts was not between destroy-
ing the Act or deferring to the Board's aggressive enforcement of its
provisions, but rather, the choice involved determining the proper
limits of the Board's authority and drawing clear lines around that
authority to safeguard traditional judicial powers and functions.
Thus, the battle among circuit court judges who determined whether
to enforce or vacate Board decisions revealed a deeper struggle con-
cerning the role of administrative agencies in the American form of
governance. For the Board, this struggle on the circuit court benches
meant that the agency faced a divided judicial landscape. These divi-
sions subsequently resulted in the uneven enforcement of the Act's
new protections. Moreover, the battle on the benches forced the
Board to continually meet the challenge of differing standards of con-
duct and evidence as well as limits on its administrative and judicial
authority.
Few historians have examined the important role that circuit
court judges played in the labor relations system set up with the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Instead, most have focused on
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the new labor legislation.' 9 By
17. NLRA, supra note 5, at § 10(F).
18. Id. at§10(E).
19. Those associated with Critical Legal Studies (CLS) have showered the most recent
attention upon the Supreme Court's handling of Wagner Act cases. This group of scholars has
been primarily concerned with the question of whether the Court essentially upheld or "de-radi-
calized" the Wagner Act. For examples of the CLS approach see Karl E. Klare, Judicial De-
Radicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62
MINN. L. REV. 265 n.3 (1978); JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTION IN AMERICAN
LABOR LAW (1983).
Earlier historians tend to gloss over the circuit courts' role when looking at the development
of American labor law after passage of the Wagner Act. Irving Bernstein focuses his attention
upon the Supreme Court and what he sees as a "revolution" in its upholding of the Act's consti-
tutionality. Richard Cortner and Peter Irons both discuss the NLRB's strategy of "circuit shop-
ping" for judges likely to uphold their decisions in his study of the Wagner Act cases. None,
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
focusing on the Supreme Court, however, these historians overlook the
intense battles that took place over the NLRA within the nation's
eleven federal circuit courts of appeals. Circuit court judges handed
down the first rulings concerning the Wagner Act, and it was from
this group of judges that both employers and the NLRB sought relief
or orders of enforcement.2" Though bound to accept rulings of the
Supreme Court as precedent, circuit court judges, nonetheless, exerted
an enormous amount of influence over how effectively the Board
enforced the Act in different regions of the nation.
An examination of circuit court rulings concerning the NLRA
from 1936 through January 1942 reveals the struggle waged by some
circuit court judges to preserve the integrity of the judicial branch
against intrusions from the NLRB and the rise of a reinvigorated con-
ceptualist legal critique of the New Deal administrative state. 21 These
judges resisted the invasion of federal power into the employment
relationship and interpreted as narrowly as possible the powers and
scope of the NLRB. Additionally, most of these judges did not chal-
lenge the NLRB with purely nineteenth-century legal conceptualist or
formalist reasoning. By the 1930s, they too had adopted many realist
assumptions concerning law and spoke in a realist rhetoric. However,
instead of championing the rise of administrative law and agencies,
these judges reasserted legal principles firmly rooted in pre-Depres-
sion America.2 2 In essence a strain of legal formalism, though dis-
guised, "persisted under the realist banner" within the federal circuit
courts in their decisions concerning the new labor board.
23
The conflicting judicial attitudes expressed in the circuit courts
did not solely concern the legitimacy of the new labor legislation. The
battles over the Wagner Act also reflected deeper differences both
over the role of the judiciary in the New Deal political order and the
emergence of powerful administrative agencies seemingly operating
outside of the Constitution. These legal and judicial differences
exhibited in the circuit courts originated partly in the two competing
schools of legal thought circulating in the early twentieth century.
however, explores these judicial differences in any detail. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 5;
RICHARD CORTNER, THE WAGNER ACT CASES (1964); PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL
LAWYERS (1982).
20. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 5.
21. The first Wagner Act cases did not reach the federal circuit courts until Spring 1936
and, in January 1942, the National War Labor Board assumed command of the nation's labor
relations machinery for the duration of World War II.
22. See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (on legal conceptualism).
23. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 64 (1995).
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II. Two COMPETING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT: LEGAL
CONCEPTUALISM AND LEGAL REALISM
The battles among the judges sitting on the circuit court benches
over the new labor board illustrate differing conceptions concerning
the role of the administrative agency in the American form of govern-
ance. The legal battles over the NLRB also reflect the two competing
schools of legal thought circulating in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. During the early twentieth century, the dominant
classical legal thought, legal conceptualism, came under increasing
pressure from a new school of legal thinking, often called legal realism.
Legal conceptualism was firmly embedded in the notion that the indi-
vidual was the foundation of society and the free market represented
the natural ordering of the economy. Realism, on the other hand,
challenged the individual's central place in the law and believed the
free market was a human construct that benefited certain groups at the
expense of others. The free market to realists was neither natural nor
neutral in its operation.
A. Legal Conceptualism
Most judges coming of age in the late nineteenth century were
products of the "classical legal thought" tradition, or legal conceptual-
ism.24 Proponents of legal conceptualism believed that law "was the
embodiment of timeless principles of truth and right" that did not
vary either over time or with changing economic or social conditions,
as did political decision making.2" To legal conceptualists, law was a
science, as they "aspired to import into the process of legal reasoning
the qualities of certainty and logical inexorability."26 In theory, judges
studied their case books and legal categories and applied the law objec-
tively to cases that came before their benches. This had the effect, as
Morton Horwitz points out, of raising the credibility and prestige of
judges by endowing their opinions with a sense of scientific objectiv-
ity, while at the same time creating "a self-contained system of legal
reasoning that would be immune to the charge that it was simply
political."27
Classical legal thought was also influenced by the laissez faire
legal tradition. Laissez faire was a product of the courts rather than
24. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODoxY 3 (1992).
25. DANIEL ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO COR-
PORATE LIBERALISM 70 (1995).
26. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 16.
27. Id.
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the academy.2" In laissez faire legal tradition, the individual stood at
the center of legal formalist thought, especially as interpreted in judi-
cial circles. 29 This "atomistic individualism"3 of the courts viewed
the individual as the fundamental unit of society and "individualism
as a moral and economic ideal."31 In practice, this philosophy viewed
"the freedom of the market [as] essentially the freedom of the individ-
ual to strike, or indeed not to strike, private bargains., 3 2 Additionally,
this laissez faire component of legal conceptualism viewed freedom of
contract as one of the most fundamental of liberties whereby "each is
free to offer; each is free to accept; each is free to refuse .... But...
no one may force another to part with his goods; no one may force
another to take a specified price; for no one can do so without assum-
ing more liberty of action than the man whom he thus treats."33
Under this theory, the free market was sacrosanct, immune from gov-
ernment intrusion.
However, this viewpoint did not mean that all individuals were
equal, or should be made equal, when it came to their respective bar-
gaining positions within the market.34 The laissez faire legal tradition
argued only that all individuals have a right to compete, enjoying
whatever economic leverage they are able to muster. The tradition
based its argument on the principle that the weak will fail and the
strong thrive through the natural selection of the market.35
In the labor relations field, legal formalists argued individual
workers should bargain with their employers for the sale of their labor.
If the workers did not accept the terms of the contract, they had a
right to find alternate employment. Similarly, employers had a right
to hire and fire whomever they pleased. Even with its laissez faire
component, legal conceptualism did not concern itself with the inher-
ent inequalities within the marketplace or between employers and
workers.36 Therefore, as society became increasingly industrial and
workers began to organize in increasing numbers, the foundations of
legal conceptualism began to erode.
28. DUXBURY, supra note 23, at 25.
29. Id. at 25-26.
30. ERNST, supra note 25, at 2.
31. DUXBURY, supra note 23, at 26.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 27.
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B. Legal Realism
Through the early twentieth century, legal realism, a new mode
of legal thought, made headway against legal conceptualism, which
dominated the late nineteenth century.37 According to legal realists, as
society became increasingly industrial and organized along class lines,
nineteenth-century classical legal thought based upon "atomistic indi-
vidualism ... had come to be out of touch with reality."3 Realists
believed law constituted a living organism, constantly evolving with
changing social and economic conditions.39 Some within the realist
camp pushed the concept of a living law even further. Instead of con-
tenting themselves with bringing law in line with the social reality of
the 1930s, the more aggressive legal realists advocated the active use of
the law as a tool for transforming, rather than merely reflecting, con-
temporary social conditions.4"
Additionally, realists attacked the formalist or legal conceptualist
veneration of the free market as both natural and sacrosanct from pub-
lic regulation.41 Realists, however, countered that the free market was
neither free nor natural; rather, it was socially constructed, served par-
ticular interests over others, and relied on coercion rather than the vol-
untary striking of contracts as envisioned by the formalists.42
Moreover, legal conceptualism's "scientific" language and meth-
ods cloaked deep-seated judicial biases, while its veneration of the
natural function of the free market glossed over the current coercive
nature of unfettered competition between unequal competitors.43
Therefore, the realists continued, because the free market was no
longer comprised of individuals "freely" achieving their self-interests,
it was also no longer neutral.44 Thus, the realists concluded that there
was room for state interference.4" Once market outcomes were no
longer regarded as natural, state regulation could not be accused of
hindering the natural development of society or the economy.46
Some realists took the living notion of law and the socially con-
structed nature of the free market a step further.47 This realist group
37. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 3-7.
38. See ERNST, supra note 25, at 2; HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 187.
39. HOROWITZ, supra note 24, at 188.
40. ERNST, supra note 25, at 70.
41. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 195.
42. Id. at 195-96.
43. See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT
HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998).
44. ERNST, supra note 25, at 70.
45. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 198.
46. Id.
47. See ERNST, supra note 25, at 70.
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attempted to bring what they saw as a "lagging law" back into line
with a rapidly changing society.4" While the conceptualists applied
general and (they would argue) timeless principles to the cases that
arose before them, this realist group saw law as a much more dynamic
force. Some, such as Pound,49 thought law needed to focus on "the
adjustment of principles and doctrine to the human condition they are
to govern."5" This meant simply bringing legal doctrine up to date
with contemporary social reality. Jerome Frank also believed that
modern problems required a "legal system capable of fluidity and pli-
ancy."51 In practice, this meant that judges and lawyers must "con-
stantly overhaul and adapt" the law to "ever-changing social, indus-
trial, and political conditions. "52 Others, such as Felix Frankfurter,
argued that law should play a much more active role in society. 3 Law,
he argued, was "a vital agency for human betterment," and those in
the legal profession should become "the directors of social forces."5 4
Law, to this realist group, was not the mere passive application of
case law or legal principles to legal controversies; rather, law was a
much more active social force. Conceptualists might have been con-
tent with law sitting on the social and economic sidelines while indi-
viduals competed freely in the marketplace, but realists were ready to
use law and the state to level the playing field. 5
The New Deal provided realists with an opportunity to put fac-
ets of their legal ideology in action. 6 Although it should be noted that
the New Deal was not a direct manifestation of legal realism, it none-
theless represented many of the realists' fundamental ideas and
beliefs.5 7 For example, the notion that the free market alone would
48. Id.
49. Id. Born in 1870, Roscoe Pound served as Dean of Harvard Law School from 1916-
1936. Pound is associated with the sociological jurisprudence movement of the opening years of
the twentieth century, the antecedent to realism.
50. Id.
51. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 7 (1930).




56. Like legal conceptualism, legal realism is a broad category and not a fixed set of ideas
and beliefs. There was much variation among self-identified legal realists, as will be explored
later in this Article in the sections dealing with the circuit courts. All legal realists agreed, how-
ever, that law needed to be brought back in touch with real life and legal conceptualism was not a
value-free or objective application of the law.
57. KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 271 (1989).
Morton Horwitz also draws parallaels between legal realism and the New Deal administrative
State. Horwitz argues that the New Deal, as well as the Supreme Court's sudden support for the
administrative state in 1937, "constituted the successful culmination of a generation of intellec-
tual struggle against the legal foundations of the old order." MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
[Vol. 23:503
Battle on the Benches
produce the best social good expired with the Great Depression's eco-
nomic havoc. The Depression revealed that the state needed to play a
more active role in directing contemporary society's complicated social
and economic forces; it could no longer sit on the sidelines. Addition-
ally, the Depression undermined the conceptualist notion that the
individual constituted society's fundamental unit. The massive eco-
nomic and social upheaval of the 1930s could be solved only on a
national basis, not at the individual level, because the problem was a
result of systemic problems and not individual failings.
Most of the New Deal programs were imbued with the realist
notion that law and government should play active roles in society.
President Roosevelt actively reshaped the federal government, pri-
marily by creating administrative agencies, battling with the Depres-
sion, and taking the federal government into territory once considered
private and free from public oversight. Federal legislation, such as
that creating the National Recovery Administration, the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the
National Labor Relations Act, undertook to involve the federal gov-
ernment in economic and social planning. Though legal realists did
not head these agencies, the New Deal administrative state neverthe-
less reflected some of the primary realist tenets which had evolved
through the early twentieth century. This similarity between realist
legal thinking and the New Deal administrative state raised the ire of
many federal circuit court judges.5"
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3 (1992).
Neil Duxbury, however, argues that historians have exaggerated the connections between legal
realism and the New Deal administartive state. Duxbury asserts that "at a very generalized level,
relaist jurisprudence and New Deal politics intermeshed" in that both treated "law a tool for
shaping social policy." However, Duxbury further notes that realism "never truly evolved into a
jurisprudence of legislation and administrative regulation." Legal realists, he contends, were
"concerned mianly with adjudication rather than with administration or the interpretation of
statutes." NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 156-57 (1995).
58. One of the most vigorous champions of the administrative process during the New
Deal years was James M. Landis. He saw the growth of administration as arising "from the
inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of government to deal with modern problems." JAMES
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938). Landis charged that the courts, in particu-
lar, were unable or at least unwilling to deal with the problems of contemporary society and, in
good conceptualist fashion, were prone to making decisions "springing from generalizations and
principles drawn from the majestic authority of textbooks and cases." The administrative
agency, however, since it was designed to focus on one specific problem made law "from a 'prac-
tical judgment which [was] based upon all the available considerations and which [had] in mind
the most desirable and pragmatic method of solving that particular problem."' Id. at 1, 24.
Though Landis was never included within the realist camp during the 1930s, Morton Hor-
witz argues that his defense of administration nevertheless drew from earlier "Progressive and
Legal Realist attacks on the inefficiency of the judicial process and on the inability of judges
trained in common law methods of thought to bring either consistency or deep social under-
standing to the task of regulation." HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 214-15.
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The rise of powerful administrative agencies during the New
Deal, however, sparked a judicial counterattack in the lower federal
courts against these dangerous tendencies in the deformation of the
American system of governance.5 9 Aware of the gap between late
nineteenth-century legal thought and contemporary social conditions,
judicial critics of the New Deal resisted what they saw as the blatant
politicization of the law as well as the subordination of property and
individual rights inherent within the New Deal administrative state.6 °
Many circuit court judges opposed to the new labor board did not try
to resurrect the legal conceptualism of the late nineteenth century.6'
Rather, they agreed with the realists that the examination of the law
no longer constituted a "determinate, objective, and value-free opera-
tion.'6 Nevertheless, these circuit court judges insisted that legal and
political reasoning still differed fundamentally from one another.63
Furthermore, although this group of judges recognized the need
for such administrative agencies as the NLRB, they questioned the
Board's usurpation of the constitutional privileges granted solely to the
judiciary and its limitations of what the judges saw as traditional indi-
vidual and property rights. Therefore, the primary problem for
judges' antagonistic attitude toward the Board was not whether the
law should be brought into line with contemporary social conditions,
but whether the rise of powerful administrative agencies, which seem-
ingly operated outside of the Constitution and traditional law, was a
proper extension of federal and executive branch power.
This paper examines the efforts of some circuit court judges to
preserve the integrity of the judicial branch against the encroaching
Thus, the issue is not whether legal realism headed New Deal agencies, but rather it is legal
realism's focus on bringing law back into line with social reality, its belief that law was made
rather than found opened the door to the administrative state. For more information on Landis,
see THOMAS MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KHAN (1984); DONALD A. RITCHIE, JAMES M.
LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980).
59. The Supreme Court was a steadfast foe of Roosevelt's New Deal through the spring of
1937 and had knocked down most of the First New Deal as unconstitutional by 1935. In A.L.R.
Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Court ruled the NIRA unconstitu-
tional. A year later, in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, (1936), the Supreme Court further
ruled the AAA unconstitutional. The most important case as far as the NLRB was concerned,
however, was the Court's ruling in the Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
which struck down the Guffey Bituminous Coal Act of 1935, whose labor relations provisions
were modeled on those in the NLRA.
60. Hutcheson, supra note 2, offers a good example of how some judges believed the New
Deal undermined individual and property rights as well as subverting the notion that the U.S.
was a government of laws and not of men.
61. I have examined the judges in the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
62. Klare, supra note 19, at 278.
63. Id.
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power of the New Deal administrative agencies, especially as repre-
sented by the NLRB. This paper offers a historical overview of the
relationship between two circuits and the NLRB; one circuit wel-
comed the Board's aggressive enforcement of the Act, while the other
expressed hostility towards the labor agency's powers and interpreta-
tion of the Wagner Act. An examination of the NLRB opinions in
these two circuits illustrates the opposing judicial attitudes toward the
new turn in labor law reflected in the Wagner Act. More signifi-
cantly, the opinions also reflect deeply held differences concerning the
role of the administrative agency in the American form of governance.
The Eighth Circuit judges believed law must change and conform to
society's needs. The Great Depression, then, called for drastic
changes in both the American form of governance and in labor law.
The Fifth Circuit judges, however, although agreeing that law must
reflect the needs and conditions of contemporary society, nevertheless
asserted that these changes must occur within constitutional bounds
and the traditional form of American governance, both of which the
NLRB trespassed upon.
The circuit courts heard three hundred eighty-eight NLRB cases
from 1935 through January of 1942.64
NLRB Cases in the Circuit Courts of Appeals (1935-1942)
Circuit Enforced Vacated Modified Other Total
D.C. 6 (75) 0 2 (25%) 0 8
1 9 (60%) 1 (7%) 4 (26%) 1 (7%) 15
2 16 (41%) 4 (10%) 17 (44%) 2 (5%) 39
3 19 (50%) 7 (18%) 8 (21%) 4 (11%) 38
4 15 (34%) 10 (25%) 16 (39%) 1 (2%) 41
5 17 (39%) 18 (41%) 5 (11%) 4 (9%) 44
6 19 (41%) 9 (20%) 11 (24%) 7 (15%) 46
7 23 (40%) 14 (24%) 21 (36%) 0 58
8 33 (73%) 3 (7%) 5 (11%) 4 (9%) 45
9 13 (32%) 14 (35%) 9 (22%) 4 (10%) 40
10 8 (57%) 1 (7%) 5 (36%) 0 14
Total 177 (46%) 81 (21%) 103 (26%) 27 (7%) 388
64. There were four-hundred fifty-seven listed in the Federal Reporter, however, that total
also includes consent decrees. It appears that not all of the circuits chose to publish the consent
decrees entered into in their circuits. The Eighth Circuit published all of these decrees while
others did not publish any. All of the consent decrees entered into by the board and employers
are listed in the Board's annual reports.
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Overall, the Board won forty-six percent of its orders brought
before circuit court judges. However, the circuit courts vacated the
Board's orders in twenty-one percent of its decisions and modified
them in another twenty-six percent of the courts' decisions.6" These
numbers, however, reflect the Board's overall average in the circuit
courts and hide the wide variations within the individual circuit
courts.
The Eighth Circuit judges were the most favorable toward the
NLRB. These judges heard forty-five cases concerning the Wagner
Act between 1935 and January 1942. Moreover, nearly seventy-three
percent of their opinions favored the Board, while only seven percent
were against it. The Eighth Circuit modified an additional five Board
orders, and four of their decisions fall outside these three categories.
66
No other circuit upheld and enforced a greater percentage of the
NLRB's final orders. The First and Tenth Circuits ordered enforce-
ment of only sixty- and fifty-seven percent of the Board's findings,
respectively, but these judges ruled on only twenty-nine cases during
the time period considered. The Third Circuit, which heard nearly
the same number of cases as the Eighth, sided with the Board only half
of the time.
Nevertheless, although the Eighth Circuit proved welcoming to
the NLRB and its enforcement of the Wagner Act, the Fifth Circuit
judges were much more hostile to the New Deal administrative state.
For example, the Fifth Circuit judges enforced only thirty-nine per-
cent of the forty-four NLRB decisions presented for their review.
This is among the highest percentage of reversals in all the circuit
courts of appeals. Only eighteen out of forty-four cases, forty-one
percent of NLRB orders survived judicial review and were fully
enforced by the court. The court modified an additional eleven
percent of the Board's decisions before ordering them enforced. Thus,
over fifty percent of the Board's orders in this circuit, as opposed to
fewer than twenty percent in the Eighth, were either wholly vacated or
substantially modified before being enforced.
65. A modified decision is one in which the court decided that portions of the order could
be enforced while others were to be denied. Modifications could be substantial or minimal.
Orders of the Board enforced with minimal modifications I have placed in the enforced category,
while those that were substantially modified to lose most of their original intent and force I have
placed in the lost category.
66. Cases that fall under the "other" category include those in which a special master was
appointed to take additional evidence in the case or in which the court referred the matter back to
the Board for additional action before it would offer a ruling.
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III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S INFLUENCE ON LABOR LAW
The Eighth Circuit judges were the most friendly toward the
Board. They tended to give the Board greater leeway in enforcing the
Act than did the other circuit courts.67 The Eighth Circuit judges
tended to be wary of interfering with the Board's operations and used
the powers granted to them lightly in deciding whether to overturn
Board decisions.6" This restricted oversight of the Board covered near-
ly all facets of its administration.69 For example, the judges enforced
the Board's rulings in the face of questionable evidence, allowed the
Board to create multiplant bargaining units, and hesitated to extend
strict judicial oversight over the Board, reasoning that the Board was
the agency best left in charge of "effectuat[ing] the purposes of the
Act."7
The Eighth Circuit's opinions regarding the Wagner Act reflect-
ed some primary tenets of legal realism as it gained a stronger foothold
during the 1930s. Legal realists accepted administrative agencies as
legitimate entities of the American form of governance. Judges in the
Eighth Circuit, like James Landis, believed administrative bodies were
best suited to deal with the problems of modern society. Their deci-
sions reflect the belief that law should play an active force in society.
The Eighth Circuit judges did not view the NLRA as merely a nega-
tive piece of legislation that prohibited certain employer actions;
rather, they viewed the NLRA as a positive piece of social legislation
designed to fundamentally alter power relations between workers and
employers. Finally, these judges acknowledged the inherent inequali-
ties in bargaining power within the marketplace between employers
and their workers. Therefore, they accepted the notion that America
was a class-divided society and supported the Board's efforts to
strengthen the bargaining positions of workers through the creation of
multiplant bargaining units.
A. Pratt v. Stout: Is the Wagner Act Constitutional?
Initially, the new Board did not hold out much hope for the
Eighth Circuit. In August 1936 the court refused to lift a temporary
injunction placed on the Board by Judge Merrill E. Otis of the West-
67. See chart, infra Part II.B.
68. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1939); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
NLRB, 102 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1939).
69. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940); Cupples Co. v.
NLRB, 106 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1939).
70. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 113 F.2d at 701.
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ern District of Missouri." In a unanimous opinion written by Judge
John Sanborn, the court ruled that the granting of the temporary
injunction "will not be disturbed unless contrary to some rule of equi-
ty or the result of an improvident exercise of judicial discretion. "72
The court argued that the questions concerning the suit were "grave
and difficult," and the possible injury to the company could be "sub-
stantial and irreparable" if the temporary injunction was denied.73
Thus, because the injunction "will not result in too great injury" to
the Board and the issues at stake were of such great importance, the
court believed that the injunction should remain in effect until the
controversy received a full hearing at the district court level.74
However, the court refused to rule on the Wagner Act's consti-
tutionality.7" The controversy brought before it, the court noted, was
the granting of the temporary injunction and not the constitutional
status of the NLRA.76 Interestingly, the reason given for maintaining
the injunction foreshadowed the court's future relationship with the
NLRB. "Since the granting or withholding of a temporary injunction
rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court," Judge Sanborn
wrote, "its order may not be reversed.., without clear proof of an
abuse of discretion even though the appellate court" might have ruled
differently concerning the injunction.77 The court ruled that there was
71. Pratt v. Stout, 85 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1938). In Stout v. Pratt, 12 F. Supp. 864 (W.D.
Mo. 1935), District Court Judge Merrill C. Otis granted a temporary injunction to the Stout
family, operators of a small flour mill in Missouri, prohibiting the Board from proceeding with
its unfair labor practices case against the company. The case began when the workers at the
plant organized a union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Id. at 865. Their
demands however, were met with resistance and the employer shut down the mill. Id. Upon
reopening the mill, the employer rehired all former employees who applied for their jobs and
refused to deal with the workers on a collective basis. Id. at 865-66. The Board then entered the
picture, charging the company with violating the NLRA by refusing to bargain collectively with
the workers' chosen bargaining representatives. Id. at 866.
Otis issued the injunction and attacked the NLRA as clearly unconstitutional. Id. at 871.
He criticized the Board's defense that the Act was constitutional under the commerce clause
because if the employer does not bargain, the workers may strike, and, thus, less flour will be
introduced into interstate commerce. Id. at 867-68. Otis responded that "[iut is difficult to
imagine anything more remote from another and less directly connected with [interstate com-
merce] than is the first step in this suggested chain of events from and with the last." Id. at 868.
More importantly, Otis stressed, "manufacturing is not commerce nor any part of commerce."
Id. at 867. He also dismissed the Board's assertion that the company had an adequate remedy at
law to challenge any decision of the agency through appeal to the circuit courts. Id. at 870. Otis
argued, however, that "the whole act is unconstitutional including that part of it which purports
to give a remedy to those who may be injured by the enforcement of the act." Id. at 871.
72. Pratt, 85 F.2d at 176.
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id. at 181.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 177.
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no evidence that Judge Otis abused his powers by issuing the injunc-
tion; thus, they were unable to reverse his order.7" The judges on this
bench followed a similar path when it came to reviewing orders of the
NLRB. They were careful not to infringe upon the duties of admin-
istrative agencies or other judicial benches through an overly aggres-
sive use of their powers of judicial review.
Though Judge Sanborn's opinion "refrained from expressing an
opinion as to the constitutionality of the Act," the court did discuss
the NLRA as part of their decision.79 The court considered the con-
stitutional questions raised by the Wagner Act to be sufficiently
important to uphold the district court's injunction. The court, how-
ever, did not necessarily agree with Judge Otis' conclusions."0 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Sanborn noted, upheld the
Act's constitutionality in Associated Press but struck it down in their
Friedman-Harry Marks opinion on the grounds that the NLRA did
not encompass the labor relations of an employer engaged in manufac-
turing." The Eighth Circuit, though, was not sure "[w]hether the act,
in view of its language, may be limited by construction so as to apply
only to labor relations in or directly affecting interstate com-
merce... ."2 The Eighth Circuit, then, believed the Act might have
had a broader applicability than offered by the Second Circuit.
In light of several other circuit court and Supreme Court rulings,
the Eighth Circuit's uncertainty of the Act's applicability to manu-
facturing concerns proves interesting. By the summer of 1936, most
judges believed the Act was clearly unconstitutional as applied to cor-
porations engaged exclusively in manufacturing.83 The Second, Fifth,
78. Id. at 180.
79. Id. at 177-78.
80. Id. at 178-79.
81. See NLRB v. Associated Press, 85 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1936); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 85 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1936).
82. Pratt, 85 F.2d at 178.
83. By August 5, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits had ruled the Act unconstitutional regarding
employers engaged in manufacturing. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998
(5th Cir. 1936); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. NLRB, 85 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1936). The Fifth Circuit
in Jones & Laughlin wrote that "the Board has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute between
employer and employees touching the discharge of laborers in a steel plant, who were engaged
only in manufacture. The Constitution does not vest in the federal government the power to
regulate the relation as such of employer and employee in production or manufacture." Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d at 998. In Fruehauf Trailer Co., the Sixth Circuit ruled that since
the Board's order
is directed to the control and regulation of the relations between the trailer company
and its employees in respect to their activities in the manufacture and production of
trailers and does not directly affect any phase of any interstate commerce in which the
trailer company may be engaged, and since, under the ruling of Carter v. Carter Coal
Company, the Congress has no authority or power to regulate or control such relations
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and Sixth Circuits had all ruled that the Act did not apply to employ-
ers engaged in manufacturing as opposed to commerce, and the Su-
preme Court also drew a very clear line demarcating commerce from
production. 4 The circuits that ruled on the Act believed themselves
bound by the Supreme Court's ruling in Carter, which drew a clear
line between commerce and production."5 The mining of coal, the
Court argued, "brings the subject-matter of commerce into existence,"
while "commerce disposes of it." 6 Thus, by the summer of 1936, the
question of Congress' power in the field of labor relations appeared
clearly confined to those concerns directly affecting or engaged in
interstate commerce and not manufacturing. The judges in the Eighth
Circuit, however, did not concede that the Board's powers were so
limited.
The Court's upholding of the injunction, nevertheless, brought
the work of the Board in the Eighth Circuit to "a complete and utter
halt. '"87 The injunction shut down the Board's Kansas City, Missouri
office by preventing the regional director from taking any complaints
or launching any more investigations of employer violations of the
Act. "Our paychecks were received," the regional director for the
Kansas City office remembered, "but nothing else happened between
the 15th of October, 1935, till April 12, 1937. '""8 Thus, unlike several
of the other circuits, which had dismissed the district court injunctions
against the Board, the Eighth Circuit did not issue its first rulings on
the Act until well after its constitutionality had been settled. 9
B. Constitutionality Determined: Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB and
the Eighth Circuit's Deference to the Board
After the Supreme Court upheld the Act's constitutionality in
the spring of 1937, the Eighth Circuit proved to be one of the friendli-
est to the now legitimate Board.9" Moreover, their first written opin-
between the trailer company and its employees, the [NLRB] was without authority to
issue the order.
85 F.2d at 392.
84. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); see also NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks, 85 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1936); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936);
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer, 85 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1936).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 304.
87. George Pratt, NLRB Oral History Project (Kheel Center for Labor-Management
Archives, Cornell University).
88. Id.
89. Its first decision on the Act after the Pratt decision was not handed down until March
1939. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1939).
90. See chart, infra Part II.B.
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ions concerning the new legislation initiated a pattern of judicial defer-
ence to the Board's decisions and the Board's aggressive enforcement
of the Act. This deference was illustrated in Cudahy Packing Co., the
Eighth Circuit's first case after Stout.9 The central dispute in Cudahy
Packing Co. originated in April 1937, when workers at a Minnesota
meatpacking plant organized an independent labor union.92 The
Board initially found that the new union had the support of a majority
of the workers at the plant and had successfully signed a contract with
the employer.93 The following month, however, an organizer for the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), who had also hoped to
organize the plant, approached the Board. The CIO organizer
charged the employer with "dominating and interfering with the
formation and administration" of the independent union.94 The Board
took up the charge, conducted a hearing, and found the company
guilty of committing an unfair labor practice.9" The Board ordered the
company to "withdraw all recognition" from the independent union
and "completely disestablish said organization" as the representative
of its workers.96
The Board's ruling prompted the company and the independent
union to file an appeal in the Eighth Circuit.97 The company argued
that the only evidence supporting the Board's determination that an
unfair labor practice had occurred was the testimony of the CIO
organizer.9" The court acknowledged the Board's lack of evidence
even when "stated in the aspect most favorable to the Board" but,
nonetheless, upheld and enforced the original Board decision.99 The
court ruled that "[w]hile the evidence, by no means, shows any fla-
grant interference, much less coercion of employees in the forma-
tion.., of the independent union," it could not say "there is not
some... evidence of company influence. ...""' Thus, despite the
preponderance of the evidence proving the independent union's ability
"to function as a free representative of the employees," and that it
truly represented the concerns of the plant's workers, the court
deferred to the Board and upheld its order.'0 '
91. Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1939).
92. Id. at 748-49.




97. Id. at 745.
98. Id. at 750.
99. Id. at 751.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 753. The first Cudahy case is one of many where the judges in the Eighth Cir-
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In 1939 the Eighth Circuit also partially deferred to the Board's
interpretation of the evidence in Cupples Co. v. NLRB.1 12 The court
ruled that though the burden of evidence in an unfair labor practices
charge is upon the Board, it was nonetheless "entitled to have the evi-
dence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom
viewed in the light most favorable to its conclusions. "103 Judge John
Sanborn ruled that "[q]uestions involving the weight of evidence and
the credibility of witnesses" were for the Board to determine.
10 4
The court cited this same reasoning sixteen months later in
another decision involving the Cudahy Packing Company." 5 The
court in Cudahy II stated that "[w]hile the burden is upon the Board
to sustain its findings, it is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable
inferences supporting its findings."10' 6 "It is not the province of this
Court," the court continued, "to weigh the evidence and determine the
accuracy of the Board's finding of fact."107 Though the court ulti-
mately found that the Board in Cudahy II failed to prove its case in
regards to one discharge, the court nonetheless granted the agency
great leeway in the interpretation of its evidence.' Thus, Eight Cir-
cuit judges again acknowledged that although the court held ultimate
authority to enforce or overturn Board orders, they believed this a lim-
ited power to be used only in the most extreme circumstances.
The court's decisions in Cudahy Packing Co. and Cupples Co.
reflected the Eighth Circuit's overall deference to the Board and its
enforcement of the Act. The court proved unwilling to hinder the
Board even when faced with less than credible evidence that the
employer had violated the Act or that the independent union was not a
legitimate bargaining representative for the workers. While the judges
in the Fifth Circuit repeatedly applied the heavy hand of judicial
review over Board decisions, those in the Eighth Circuit hesitated
cuit summarily sided with an affiliate of the CIO against an independent labor organization.
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, usually sided with the independent union and criticized the
Board for acting as an organizer for the CIO. For examples of the Eighth Circuit's preference for
nationally affiliated labor organizations, see NLRB v. Viking Pump Co., 113 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1940); NLRB v. Christian Bd. of Publication, 113 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1940); Kansas City Power
& Light Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1940).
102. Cupples Co. Mfr. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1939).
103. Id. at 104.
104. Id.
105. Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1940) [hereinafter Cudahy II].
In Cudahy II, the Board had ordered the company to disestablish the independent union and to
offer reinstatement, along with seniority rights, to six workers unfairly discharged because of
union activities. Id.
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before substituting their discretion for the Board's in enforcing the
Act. These decisions also exemplify the Eighth Circuit's belief, which
was much the same as Landis', in the superiority of administrative
over judicial adjudication in the realm of labor relations. The judges
in this circuit viewed their relationship with the Board as one of equals
and were vigilant about "keeping to the right of the line" that marked
off their jurisdiction from that of the NLRB's. °9 This placed the
Eighth Circuit in direct opposition to the Fifth Circuit, whose judges
continually asserted the Board' inferior position in relation to the con-
stitutionally based federal judicial system.
C. Multiplant Bargaining Units and Collective Bargaining
The Eighth Circuit also encouraged the Board's efforts at creat-
ing multiplant bargaining units, which gave workers more leverage
when bargaining with their employers. The judges in the Eighth Cir-
cuit clearly believed the Board held broad powers to determine appro-
priate bargaining units and that the courts were powerless to infringe
upon that statutory prerogative. They also approved of the Board's
broad view of the Act's collective bargaining provisions. The Fifth
Circuit, which will be discussed later, limited the Board's intrusion
into the employment relationship once workers successfully organized.
The judges in the Eighth Circuit, however, permitted the Board
greater latitude to intervene in the labor relationship after the organ-
izational process and did not allow employers to limit the scope of
collective bargaining.
In NLRB v. Lund, the court ruled that the Board could create a
bargaining unit comprised of workers from two separate manufactur-
ing plants owned by one individual.1 ' Christian A. Lund and his
family owned the Northland Ski Manufacturing Company of St.
Louis, which Lund solely controlled, and Lund solely owned the C.A.
Lund Company of Hastings, approximately twenty miles outside of
St. Louis."1 During an organizing campaign by the AFL, the Board
found that Lund informed his workers that he would never deal with
an outside union and threatened to shut down the Hastings plant and
relocate the other plant if they joined the AFL. Lund also coerced the
employees into joining a company-dominated inside union. 2 More
importantly, however, the Board ruled that because a unity of interests
109. NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1939).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 816.
112. Id. at 817-18.
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existed between the workers at both of Lund's plants, together they
constituted the appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes.
13
Judges Stone, Woodrough, and Thomas agreed with the Board
that Lund had blatantly violated the Act and, furthermore, that the
multiplant bargaining unit was an appropriate determination.'14 Lund
claimed that the two plants constituted two separate employers as they
were two legally distinct businesses."' The court noted, however, that
employees were transferred between the two plants, the plants jointly
purchased and shared raw materials, and partially finished materials
were shipped between the plants for completion." 6 The only discern-
able difference between the plants, Judge Thomas wrote, was that the
St. Paul plant produced higher-end goods sold directly to retailers
while the Hastings plant sold somewhat lower-grade products to
wholesalers." 7
The primary reason the court provided for upholding the multi-
plant bargaining unit, however, had little to do with the technical rea-
sons concerning production at the plants. The Eighth Circuit judges
believed the Wagner Act did more than merely protect the rights of
workers to organize. The Act aimed to equalize the bargaining rela-
tionship. If the two plants were deemed separate and distinct bar-
gaining units, Thomas argued that true "collective bargaining would
be a farce.""'  Lund, with a proven history of hostility toward unions,
would be able to effectively "evade the purpose and intent of the law
by transferring business from one plant to the other.., according to
the unit with which he could make the most favorable bargain."" 19
Thus, instead of furthering the purposes of the Act, placing the work-
ers into two separate bargaining units would place the employer in the
"position where he could force competition between... his employees
to their detriment and his gain."' 20
The Eighth Circuit offered an even more daring decision con-
cerning multiplant bargaining units in the case of Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. NLRB,'21 decided in July 1940. This case began in April
1938 when the Federation of Flat Glass Workers, a CIO affiliated
union, filed a petition for investigation and certification with the direc-
113. Id. at 816.







121. 113 F.2d 698 (8thCir. 1940).
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tor of the Board's sixth region in Pittsburgh. 22 The union claimed
that the company's production and maintenance employees in all six
of its plants spread across five states constituted the appropriate unit
for collective bargaining. 123 A hearing was held in October 1938, and
the company stipulated that "the Federation included in its member-
ship a majority of the employees in the unit claimed by the Federation
to be the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. ,124
The company charged, however, that the union did not have a
majority in the Crystal City, Missouri, plant where thirteen hundred
out of the factory's eighteen hundred workers belonged to the Crystal
City Glass Workers Union, an independent labor organization.1
21
The Crystal City Glass Workers Union attempted to intervene in the
proceedings, but the trial examiner denied the organization's motion.
The company then introduced evidence, a petition signed by 1334
workers at the plant, proving that this group of workers wished to be
represented by the Crystal City Glass Workers Union rather than the
CIO affiliated organization.1
26
On January 26, 1939, the trial examiner and then the Board sided
with the Federation of Flat Glass Workers and ruled that all five
plants constituted the appropriate unit for collective bargaining pur-
poses. The company, however, refused to recognize the Board's deci-
sions, causing the Federation to lodge an unfair labor practices charge
with the Board charging that the company refused to bargain with the
union as the exclusive representative of all of its production and main-
tenance employees.'27 The company answered the charge by arguing
that "the findings of the Board were erroneous, arbitrary, and inval-
id."'1 2' Another hearing was held on March 8, 1939, at which time the
122. Petition for Review of Order of the NLRB in the case of Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
NLRB (filed September 22, 1939), National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
RG 25.
123. Id.
124. It appears that there was a stipulation agreed to by the company concerning the Fed-
eration's petition sometime after the filing of the petition in April. The meaning of the stipula-
tion, however, was under dispute, as Robert Kleeb wrote to Nathan Witt in August 8, 1938
expressing confusion over what exactly the company stipulated to in the agreement. It appears
the company was ready to stipulate that the Federation of Flat Glass Workers represented a
majority of its employees except at the Crystal City plant. Kleeb further believed that the com-
pany would stipulate that if the employer unit was found proper, the federation was the majority
choice of its workers. The company, however, was arguing for the plant unit and would not
agree to the multiplant bargaining unit thus throwing the issue into the court of appeals. Memo
from Robert Kleeb to Nathan Witt, August 8, 1938, NLRB Oral History Project, #6058 (Kheel
Center for Labor-Management Documentation & Archives, Cornell University).
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Crystal City Glass Workers Union offered to prove it now represented
sixteen hundred out of eighteen hundred workers. The trial examiner,
however, again ruled against the corporation. The Board agreed with
the examiner that the company had violated the Act by refusing to
recognize and bargain with the Federation and on September 19, 1939,
issued a cease and desist order. Three days after this decision, the
company appealed the ruling to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The company did not find a sympathetic ear on the Eighth Cir-
cuit bench. The court acknowledged that the workers at the Crystal
City plant had a unique relationship to the company's other workers,
one that marked this case as different from the Lund decision.129 They
noted that the Crystal City plant was six hundred miles away from
any of the other plants, the methods of manufacturing were different,
the plant had its own superintendent who was in charge of hiring and
firing, and the employees did not move between plants. 3 ° Sanborn's
opinion ruled, however, that the issue of the appropriate bargaining
unit was "[o]ne of the matters entrusted solely to the Board" by the
Act.13 The Board was to use its own judgement in selecting a unit
that "would best serve the public policy declared in the Act... as well
as that of the various groups of employees of the Company.... "32
Moreover, because the NLRA entrusted the determination of certain
matters to the Board alone, the circuit courts "were denied power to
substitute their judgements with respect" to the composition of the
appropriate bargaining unit for those of the Board. 133  Unless the
Board acted arbitrarily, which in this case the court argued it did not,
the court must accept the findings of the agency.'34
The judges did acknowledge the desire of the workers in Mis-
souri to maintain their own organization and bargaining representa-
tives. "It seems unfortunate that the employees at the Crystal City
Plant should be forced to accept a representative, for collective bar-
gaining, not of their own choosing," Sanborn wrote, "but that situa-
129. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940). Unlike the Lund
case, the workers in the Crystal City Plant were more than six hundred miles from any other
plant of the company and workers, and thus were not shuttled between plants as they were in the
case of Lund. Also, they were subject to the control of a different superintendent, and the manu-
facturing processes employed at the plant were distinct from the other manufacturing sites. The
Board found "the business of the company at that plant is subject to a large measure of local
control." Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 113 F.2d at 700-01.
130. Id. at 700-01.
131. Id. at 701.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 701-02.
134. Id. at 702.
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tion is not an unusual one with minorities."' 35 Though they are more
than six hundred miles from the other plants, "it cannot be truthfully
said ... that one representative for all of the employees could not bar-
gain for them as effectively or successfully as could one representative
for a part of them and another representative for another part."'3 6 The
wishes of the Crystal City workers were considered by the Board, but
the agency believed the employer unit would best effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act. Moreover, "there is nothing in the history of the col-
lective bargaining between the Company and its employees, which...
would, as a matter of law, preclude the Board from determining that
the production and maintenance employees at the six ... plants were
an appropriate bargaining unit." '
The Eighth Circuit clearly believed that the Board held broad
powers to determine appropriate bargaining units and that the courts
were powerless to infringe upon that statutory prerogative. "Unless
the finding of the Board," they wrote in the Lund decision, "is clearly
arbitrary... the court is bound by its findings."'38 In Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., the court further delineated the clear lines separating judi-
cial from administrative authority. "The determination of certain
matters... was, under the [NLRA], entrusted.., to the [NLRB]
alone, and the courts were denied power to substitute their judgements
with respect to such matters for those of the Board.""' Concerned
about "keeping to the right of the line that separates the jurisdiction of
the court from that of the Board," the Eighth Circuit judges allowed
the Board great freedom in creating bargaining units. 4°
In particular, Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. clearly illustrates the
Eighth Circuit's belief that law must change in response to social
needs and social reality. The court rejected the "atomistic individual-
ism" of classical and formalist legal thought and acknowledged that
America was not a classless society. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Board that workers belonging to differ-
ent labor organizations could not effectively counter the economic
power wielded by their employers, even if this was their wish. More-
over, the desire of these workers to remain independent not only
reduced their bargaining power, but their fellow workers in the com-
pany's other plants. The only way to ensure workers sufficient bar-
gaining power was to include them all in one bargaining unit. The
135. Id.
136. Id. at 701-02.
137. Id. at 702.
138. NLRB v. Lund, 103 F. 2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1939).
139. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 698, 701 (8th Cir. 1940).
140. Lund, 103 F.2d at 821.
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desires of these workers to keep their union could not stand in the way
of the needs of the larger group and the larger social policy aims of the
Act.
D. Collective Bargaining
The same freedom granted by the Eighth Circuit to the Board to
determine the appropriate bargaining unit was also given over the
issue of collective bargaining.141 The Eighth Circuit's interpretation of
the Wagner Act and of its purposes logically included a broad reading
of the legislation's collective bargaining provisions. This interpreta-
tion arose from the emphasis that the court placed on the objectives
embodied in section 1 of the Act. In NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., the
court emphasized that "[t]he first section of the Act recites.., the
inequality bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association and employers [affects the flow of com-
merce] and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions.... ""'
In Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, the court upheld the Board's conten-
tion that the company had violated the Act by refusing to engage in
good faith bargaining with the representatives of its workers.'43 Since
1933, the workers at Wilson & Co. were affiliated with the AFL, but
after May 1937 they switched their allegiance to United Packing
House Workers, a union affiliated with the CIO.' Though the com-
pany had negotiated wages, hours, and working conditions with the
union, "at no time," the Board charged, "has petitioner accorded for-
mal written recognition to the union.., and has not entered into any
written agreement with the union." ''"s Further, the company refused
to offer the union a counterproposal after the union submitted its
demands and there was further evidence that the employer also altered
work schedules and pay scales before consulting the representatives of
its workers.'46
Relying upon the language of the Supreme Court's Jones &
Laughlin decision, 4 7 the court agreed with the company that the "act
does not compel agreements between employers and employees.P
148
141. Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940). The Wagner Act included
under its collective bargaining provisions, rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment.
142. NLRB v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633, 635-36 (8th Cir. 1939).
143. Wilson & Co., 115 F.2dat 761.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 762.
146. Id.
147. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1957).
148. Wilson& Co., 115F.2dat763.
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This language, however, did "not sustain petitioner's contention that
bare collective bargaining, without any willingness on its part to
reduce understandings reached to writing, constitutes the kind of bar-
gaining which the law requires."' 49 The Act, Judge Sanborn wrote,
"contemplates that agreements will be reached as the result of collec-
tive bargaining."'' 0 Therefore, though the company cannot be forced
to enter into an agreement it found unacceptable, it could not refuse to
bargain or to offer counterproposals when requested by the union, or
refuse to grant official recognition to the bargaining representatives
chosen by its workers.'
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit judges opposed the Fifth Circuit
judges by holding that the Act required employers to bargain in good
faith "with respect to all matters which affect his employees as a class,
including wages, hours of employment, and working conditions." '52
While the Fifth Circuit drew a tight circle around which issues legiti-
mately fell under collective bargaining, the Eighth Circuit held an
expansive view of proper collective bargaining issues, which included
the "legislative" matters precluded in the Fifth Circuit." 3 Thus, the
company could not refuse, as it had, to bargain over the union's
demands for a closed shop and a dues check-off."4 According to the
Eighth Circuit, the appropriate matters and issues for collective bar-
gaining included all aspects of the employment relationship.
In the Eighth Circuit, most issues involving the employment
relationship constituted a valid subject for collective bargaining. Just
as the Eighth Circuit judges accepted the Board's creation of multi-
plant bargaining units, they further supported the agency's involve-
ment within the collective bargaining process itself. This process was
not considered fully private and immune from public regulation, as it
would have been under classical legal thought. On the contrary, the
Eighth Circuit decisions reflected the belief that the public policy pro-
visions of the Wagner Act necessitated NLRB intervention in the






153. See Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
154. The dues check-off allowed workers to agree to have their employer collect their union
dues directly out of their pay and then turn it over to the union. This allowed the union access to
a more dependable source of income than did asking every member each month for his dues. A
closed shop is one in which all workers must join the union within a certain amount of time after
being hired in order to keep their employment.
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E. General Policy of Judicial Deference to the Board
The Eighth Circuit's focus was not to limit the impact of the Act
on the employment relationship or merely to protect the statutory
right of workers to organize. Rather, the court actively encouraged the
Board's aggressive enforcement of its protections and fundamentally
altered the power relationships between workers and employers.15
This was accomplished by granting the Board broad powers over the
collective bargaining process and upholding its creation of multiplant
bargaining units." 6 The Eighth Circuit granted the Board near com-
plete autonomy in its enforcement of the Act. The judges believed the
Board was "entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences sup-
porting its findings"'57 and were hesitant to extend judicial oversight
over the Board's authority as the agency best left in charge of "effec-
tuat[ing] the purposes of the Act."'58
This policy of minimal oversight led the court to minimize the
Board's lapses in proper procedure. For example, in Cupples Co., the
court acknowledged that the Board's trial examiner "exceeded all rea-
sonable bounds in examining.., the witnesses of the petitioner.""'
The court agreed with the company that the Board examiner essen-
tially attempted to make the Board's case instead of acting as an
impartial finder of facts. 6 However, the court merely chastised the
examiner, warning him "to keep in mind that the proper exercise of
his functions requires open-mindedness, fairness, and impartiality.
1 6'
The court in Cupples Co. ruled against the company and held that the
trial examiner's conduct was not "so unfair as to constitute a denial of
due process." '162
While the Eighth Circuit was conscious of the line separating
judicial from administrative authority, it drew this line in quite a dif-
ferent place than the Fifth Circuit, which attempted to draw a clear
line delineating its authority from and over the Board's.'63 The Eighth
Circuit believed the Board held broad powers to enforce the Act and
would overlook, as in Cupples Co., lapses in due process or less than
155. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940); NLRB v.
Lund, 103 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1940).
156. See id.
157. Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1940).
158. NLRB v. C. Nelson Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1941); see also Cudahy
Packing Co., 116 F.2d at 366.




163. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Bell
Oil & Gas, 91 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1937).
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convincing evidence.'64 Judge Seth Thomas emphasized in Lund that
the "only purpose of the law is to achieve the purposes of the Act
without regard to too close an observance of legal technicalities."'65
Some on this bench believed that too close an observance to "legal
technicalities" would hinder the Board's enforcement of the Wagner
Act.
The NLRB found in the Eighth Circuit, then, a group of judges
fully amenable to its interpretation of the Act. The judges presiding
in this circuit affirmed the legitimacy of administrative agencies and
administrative adjudication of social problems. They believed the
NLRB was the body best able to "effectuate the purposes of the Act"
and should not be burdened with close judicial scrutiny or supervi-
sion. The Board also found a circuit occupied by judges who shared
their belief that the labor relationship was not one necessarily immune
from public regulation. While the Fifth Circuit had to accept the
legitimacy of the Act, it still limited the Board's impact within the
employment relationship, a relationship that court viewed as essen-
tially private in nature. The judges in the Eighth, on the other hand,
held no such ideas in their review of Board decisions.
IV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S INFLUENCE ON LABOR LAW
The judicial deference given to the Board in the Eighth Circuit
did not extend to the Fifth.'6 6 On the contrary, in the Fifth Circuit,
the Board found itself continually at odds with a set of judges eager to
thwart its efforts to enforce the Act. Unlike the judges in the Eighth
Circuit, "we," Judge Hutcheson wrote, "refused to follow the unsound
164. The court did have its limits, however, of what constituted proper conduct by the
Board. In Montgomery Ward v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1939), the court refused to
enforce an order of the Board because of the conduct of its trial examiner assigned to hear the
case. Id. The court argued that the trial examiner was so blatantly biased against the company
that he had denied them "that fairness which is required by due process of law." Id. at 149. The
examiner had badgered witnesses viewed as possibly friendly to the company, refused to allow
the company's attorneys to question witnesses as they saw fit, and conducted most of the Board's
case himself. Id. The court ruled that "[t]he extreme activity of the examiner in questioning of
witnesses is quite evident-there is not much hazard in estimating that probably one-half of the
pages of this record confined to testimony would show some questions by the examiner." Id. at
156. It is interesting to note, however, that though the court set aside the Board's order in its
entirety, it remanded the case back to the Board for a new hearing with a different trial examiner.
Id. at 156-57. None of the other circuits, least of all the Fifth, which we will examine in a
moment, overturned an order of the Board then told it to try again.
165. NLRB v. Lund, 113 F.2d 875, 821 (8th Cir. 1940).
166. The Fifth Circuit also enjoyed the distinction of being one of only three circuits con-
taining a majority of judges appointed by Roosevelt's three Republican predecessors for the
entire period from 1935 though 1942. By the beginning of 1942, Roosevelt's judicial appointees
either controlled all of the other circuit court benches or at least were evenly matched with those
judges appointed by Hoover and Coolidge.
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doctrine put forward in some quarters; that it was for the administra-
tive to lead, the courts to follow." '167 While the judges in the Eighth
Circuit essentially followed the Board's lead in enforcing the Act,
lightly applying the tool of judicial review and rarely overturning
Board decisions, those in the Fifth Circuit believed they had a consti-
tutional obligation to assiduously review the actions and orders of the
Board. Administrative agencies such as the Board were suspect in the
Fifth Circuit. These agencies were viewed as bodies alien to the Con-
stitution and the American form of governance because they held
powers of all three branches of government and trespassed on the ter-
ritory of the courts.168 Thus, in order to ensure that the government
remained one of laws and not of men, the Fifth Circuit vigorously
exercised its power of judicial review with the belief that "it is for the
courts and not the administrators to determine the law.'
169
In the Fifth Circuit the Board encountered a group of judges
particularly hostile to its aggressive enforcement of the Wagner Act.
Though confronted with many of the same issues faced in the Eighth
Circuit, the judges in the Fifth Circuit refused to follow the lead of the
Board by readily enforcing its orders. The result of the Fifth Circuit's
refusal to follow the Board's lead meant that the agency and workers
faced a quite different set of circumstances than in the Eighth Circuit.
The Board was faced with much higher standards of evidence, as the
court eagerly examined the Board's findings, and found its efforts to
encourage organization spurned as too aggressive and beyond the
scope of the Act.
Workers were also often at a disadvantage in the Fifth Circuit.
The judges tended to support independent unions over unions affili-
ated with the AFL or CIO, and limited the items subject to the Act's
collective bargaining provisions. Overall, the Fifth Circuit's more
stringent application of judicial review limited the Board's effective-
ness in enforcing the Act in much of the southern United States dur-
ing the period under consideration.
A. Judge Hutcheson and Judge Sibley: Conflicting Legal
Philosophies with Similar Outcomes
Judges Hutcheson and Sibley both joined the Fifth Circuit bench
on January 30, 1931, after being appointed to the court by President
167. Hutcheson, supra note 2, at 18. For biographical information on Hutcheson, see John
R. Brown, Hail to the Chief: Hutcheson, the Judge, 38 TEX. L. REV. 140 n.2 (1959); Charles L.
Zelden, The Judge Intuitive: The Life and Judicial Philosophy of Joseph C. Hutcheson Jr., 39 S.
TEX. L. REV. 905 n.4 (1998).
168. See Zelden, supra note 167, at 914.
169. Hutcheson, supra note 2.
[Vol. 23:503
Battle on the Benches
Herbert Hoover.17°  President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat,
appointed Judge Sibley, a graduate of the University of Georgia, to the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in 1919. Interest-
ingly, President Wilson had also appointed Judge Hutcheson to the
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in 1918.171 Judge
Hutcheson became chief judge of the Fifth Circuit in 1947 and retired
from the court in 1968.
Though appointed to the circuit court at the same time, Judge
Sibley and Hutcheson exhibited different judicial philosophies when
ruling on labor board cases. By the 1930s, Judge Hutcheson had jetti-
soned much of his earlier learning in classical legal thought; he was a
realist. The New Deal, however, and especially the Labor Board,
sparked a resurgent conceptualism in his judicial thinking as he
attempted to defend the existing constitutional order from what he
perceived as a grave threat. Judge Sibley, on the other hand, appeared
to be relatively immune from the influences of legal realism and
remained rooted in an older conception of law and its purpose in soci-
ety. Though they held conflicting legal philosophies, they both
arrived, with the labor board cases at least, at similar conclusions and
decisions that severely limited the Board's effectiveness in the south-
ern United States. 
172
1. Judge Hutcheson's Dominance of the Fifth Circuit
Judge Hutcheson argued that courts, not administrative agencies
such as the NLRB, should settle constitutional questions and interpret
"the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body. ' 173 Hutcheson further argued that the Constitution granted the
courts the power to determine questions of law, and while agencies
with administrative and adjudicative powers served an important
function, they had to respect the "law as determined and declared by
the courts. ' 171 Judge Hutcheson considered the Board the "most
recalcitrant" of the New Deal agencies, and believed the Board wished
170. HARVEY COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1891-1981, 52 (published
under the Auspices of the Bicentennial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 1984).
171. JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (published under the Auspices of the Bicentennial
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 2d ed. 1983).
172. Judge Sibley had among the least favorable voting records toward the NLRB. Judge
Hutcheson's record is among the most favorable for the Circuit, comparable to Judge Holmes
who was an appointee of President Roosevelt. Hutcheson's written opinions, however, in con-
trast to his voting record on the circuit, offer among the most explicit and unbending attacks
upon the Board and its procedures written by any of the circuit court judges.
173. Hutcheson, supra note 2.
174. Id.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
to "legislate, adjudicate, and execute ... without limitation or
accountability," thus violating the legislative intent of the Act and the
constitutional limits placed on executive authority.'
Judge Hutcheson was a product of the conceptualist school, and
rejected, during his early days on the bench, "the suggestion that [law]
still had life and growth."' 76 The notion that already-developed and
fixed legal categories could be applied to all situations and cases sat at
the heart of his legal education. Judge Hutcheson wrote, "I had been
trained to expect inexactitude from juries, but from the judges quite
the reverse ... I had a slot machine mind. I searched out categories
and concepts and, having found them, worshiped them.""' To
Hutcheson, law was a fully developed science in which cases fell into
preestablished legal categories, endowing judicial decisions an aura of
objectivity and scientific certainty. 7 '
However, by 1929 Judge Hutcheson had discarded the notion
that legal decisions arose from a scientific application of established
legal principles to the facts of a case.' 79 Hutcheson stated,
[a]s I associated more with real lawyers, whose intuitive faculties
were developed and made acute by the use of a trained and cul-
tivated imagination, I came to see that as long as the matter to be
considered is debated in artificial terms, there is danger of being
led by a technical definition to apply a certain name and then to
deduce consequences which have no relation to the grounds on
with the name is applied.'
Judge Hutcheson realized that law arose from specific historical
contexts and that current "regulations, the wisdom, necessity and vali-
dation of which as applied to, existing conditions, are so apparent that
they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago.., would probably
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive."'' According to
Hutcheson, law must change and reflect, to some degree, contempo-
rary social conditions and reasoning.
When the Board was forum shopping for a court in which to file
its enforcement petition against the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corpora-
tion, the agency's associate general counsel telegraphed Charles Fahy
that filing the petition in the Fifth Circuit "would secure early argu-
175. Id.
176. JOSEPH C. HUTCHESON, THE JUDGMENT INTUITIVE: THE FUNCTION OF THE
"HUNCH" IN JUDICIAL DECISION 15 (1938).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 15-16.
180. Id. at 17.
181. Id. at 18.
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ment and favorable ruling which would greatly assist the general
situation. "182 Jones & Laughlin began when the Amalgamated Asso-
ciation of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers filed a complaint with the Board
that the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, the nation's fourth larg-
est producer of steel, was interfering with its efforts to organize the
workers at the Aliquippa plant in Pennsylvania.'83 The Board took up
the complaint, held a series of hearings, and found the company had
violated of subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 8 of the Act when it dis-
charged and refused to reinstate twelve workers involved with the
union campaign.'84 The corporation denied the charges, claiming the
workers were discharged for inefficiency and that the employees had
violated work rules, and claimed that the Act violated the Fifth and
Seventh Amendments to the Constitution.' The Board, however,
decided against the company and filed a cease and desist order on
April 9, 1936.186
The Board had reason to be optimistic about its chances in the
Fifth Circuit, because the court's presiding judge was Judge Joseph C.
Hutcheson.'87 In 1928 Judge Hutcheson wrote an important opinion
concerning the Railway Labor Act.'88 In his decision, Hutcheson vig-
orously defended the Railway Labor Act and Congress' power to reg-
ulate the relationship between workers and employers in the railway
industry.'89 Not only did the court in Brotherhood hold that the
legislation in question was "within the power of Congress to enact,"
the court also emphasized that the legislation "should be liberally con-
strued and applied, so as to give effect to the paramount public con-
182. Telegram from Robert Watts to Charles Fahy, March 1936, NLRB Oral History
Project, #6058 (Kheel Center for Labor-Management Archives, Cornell University).
183. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 503 (1936). The plant at Aliquippa
employed about 10,000 of the corporation's 22,000 workers.
184. Id. at 503-04. Subdivision (1) of section 8 of the NLRA states that it is an unfair labor
practice to interfere with the rights of workers to organize. Subdivision (2) states that it is against
the Act for employers to discriminate in regards to hire or tenure of employment because of a
workers involvement in organizational or labor activities.
185. Id. at 504.
186. Id. at 517.
187. See IRONS, supra note 19, at 262.
188. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employ-
ees, S. Pac. Lines in Texas and Louisiana v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 24 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1928).
189. Id. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 granted the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, free from employer interference, to railway workers. It also contained provisions for spe-
cial mediation commissions to investigate violations of the Act as well as bargaining disputes,
during which time strikes were illegal. The language guaranteeing the rights of workers to
organize found in the Railway Labor Act served as the basis for the protections in Section 7(a) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act and then in chapter 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159, 172-73 (1994); See DUBOFSKY, supra note 6, at 100-01, 112.
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venience subserved by it."' 9 ° Judge Hutcheson ordered the company
to disestablish the company union, recognize and bargain with the
railway brotherhood, and reinstate the discharged employees. 9' The
Supreme Court upheld Hutcheson's opinion in 1930.192
Brotherhood inspired hope on the Board that Judge Hutcheson
would also "look with some favor, perhaps, upon the National Labor
Relations Act."' 9 3 Because of the Brotherhood opinion,'94 some mem-
bers of the Board even referred to Hutcheson as the "father" of the
substantive provisions of the Wagner Act. The labor board viewed
Hutcheson's opinion in Brotherhood as positive because it legitimated
the right of Congress to regulate the relationship between employers
and their employees. The employer claimed that the Railway Labor
Act violated its constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution by infringing upon its
liberty of contract.' 95 Hutcheson dismissed this defense countering
that freedom of contract is not limitless, especially when an employer
is engaged in interstate commerce.'96 Congress, Hutcheson opined,
has regularly legislated in the field of labor relations and "in cases
without number the courts have issued their injunctions declaring and
vindicating judicial power to protect the commerce of the country
from the anarchy and disruption arising out of these fierce labor dis-
putes."" 9' The railroad, Hutcheson decided, if it insists the relation-
ship with its employees is not a justiciable matter "must be prepared,
not only to give learned dissertations on the freedom of contract, but
to show ... that it [the Railway Labor Act] has not behind it a suffi-
cient force of general public opinion to create an established custom
which may be articulated into law."' 98
190. Brotherhood, 24 F.2d at 431. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 replaced the Railway
Labor Board established under the Transportation Act of 1920. The Act declared for the first
time that it was the public policy of the U.S. to support trade unionism and collective bargaining
in the railroad industry. The Act stated that workers had the right to organize and select bar-
gaining representatives free from employer coercion or interference. This language was eventu-
ally incorporated into section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and then into the
National Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994); See DUBFOSKY, supra note 6, at 100-101,
104.
191. 24 F.2d at 434.
192. See Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
193. Interview with Thomas Emerson, Columbia Oral History Project, Columbia Univer-
sity, at 451.
194. Interview with A. Norman Summers, Columbia Oral History Project, Columbia Uni-
versity.
195. Brotherhood Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 24 F.2d at 429.
196. Id. at 431.
197. Id. at 429.
198. Id.
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Hutcheson's Brotherhood opinion also revealed that he was open
to changing and growing law. "[A]ll justiciable matters," Hutcheson
wrote, "are made so by law derived from two sources... that ascer-
tained and declared by the judges as founded in and springing from
the customs of the people ... that enacted by the legislatures." '199 Law
changes, Judge Hutcheson continued, as customs adapt to "changed
conditions" and legislatures "make innovations upon it. '"20 Thus,
"through judicial decisions, and... through legislative action, the law
modifies and grows, and, growing, lives."' 0°  More importantly,
because law is living and changing, his decision continued, "it is plain
that.., whatever a particular court or Legislature might think to be
the custom could be declared to'be the law, and laws might change
with uncomfortable rapidity. 2 2  Thus, Judge Hutcheson essentially
ruled that the employer's assertion that the legislation was beyond the
powers of Congress to enact was completely without support. Law, in
Hutcheson's mind, was always changing in response to new conditions
and must do so in order to remain relevant and "alive" .2 3 Thus, the
Board chose to file the petition for enforcement of Jones & Laughlin in
the Fifth Circuit rather than watch another of their important test
cases become bogged down in the Third Circuit.2 4
During arguments in Jones & Laughlin in May 1936, counsel for
the Board found the judges in the Fifth Circuit genuinely interested in
the issues at stake because it "spent a great deal of time questioning"
the Board's attorney.25 Thomas Emerson also complimented the
judges on their attention to the case and remembered them as "rea-
sonably sympathetic" to the Board's arguments.2 6 However, Emerson
also recalled that he "didn't have any real hope of winning," for the
Supreme Court had just handed down the Carter Coal decision, inval-
idating the Guffey Coal Act, on May 18, 1935.207 Emerson stated that
199. Id. at 427.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 427-28.
202. Id. at 428.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937); see
also IRONS, supra note 19, at 254-56.
205. Interview with Emerson, supra note 193.
206. Id.
207. Id. In the Carter Coal case, the Supreme Court struck down the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 (15 U.S.C. §§ 801-27) on the grounds that Congress had no authority
to regulate employers engaged solely in production. 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936). The Act had two
purposes. The first was to regulate production in the coal industry, much like the NIRA had
attempted to bring order back to other sections of the industrial economy. The second purpose
was to regulate the labor relations between mine owners and workers. In language drawn from
the NLRA, the Guffey Act protected the rights of mine workers to organize and bargain collec-
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"[t]o persuade a lower court that our case was different from what the
Supreme Court had said just weeks before was almost an impossible
job., 211 In fact, relying on Carter Coal, the Fifth Circuit held the
NLRA unconstitutional on June 15, 1936.209
The Board, thus, was not surprised by the outcome of Jones &
Laughlin. They were, however, soon confounded by the hostility
expressed toward the labor legislation and the Board by the judges in
the Fifth Circuit after the Supreme Court declared the Act constitu-
tion in April 1937. This emergent hostility to the Act was all the
more surprising because many on the Board believed the Fifth Circuit
constituted a relatively friendly circuit. Hutcheson's, and the courts',
later opinions, though, reflected an amalgam of legal realist and con-
ceptualist principles that did not bode well for the NLRB. Hutcheson
"welcomed and encouraged good and lawful administration, "210 and
acknowledged the "necessity of keeping law dynamic and in touch
with life,"'211 especially during times of profound economic or social
upheaval.212 Although Judge Hutcheson was a legal realist, his written
opinions also reflected a belief that the NLRB had no legal or consti-
tively free from employer interference. The Supreme Court, however, in a 5-4 opinion ruled that
coal mining was production, not commerce, and thus not open to federal regulation. Id. "That
commodities," the majority wrote, "produced or manufactured within a state are intended to be
sold or transported outside the state does not render their production or manufacture subject to
federal regulation under the commerce clause." Id. at 301. "'Commerce," the Court continued,
"is the equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purposes of trade,"' id. at 298, and "[p]lainly,
the incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do not constitute such inter-
course." Id. at 303. Moreover, the evils of labor disputes, such as strikes and curtailment of
production, the Court ruled, "are all local evils over which the federal government has no legisla-
tive control." Id. at 308. Rather, "[tlhe relation of employer and employee is a local relation" for
the "employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclusively in producing a commod-
ity." Id.
208. Interview with Emerson, supra note 193. The Guffey Bituminous Coal Act of 1936
regulated competition among soft coal operators and created a code of labor relations identical to
that of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRA was in essence based upon the labor pro-
visions of the Guffey Act. The Supreme Court ruled in Carter Coal that mining was not com-
merce and thus was not open to regulation by Congress under the Constitution's commerce
clause. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. at 316. Manufacturing and commerce were two distinct and
different enterprises the court ruled. Id. at 299. The former was subject to state regulation and
the latter, if of an interstate nature, was subject to regulation by the Congress. Id. at 307. This
decision proved devastating to the Board in its battles in the circuit courts, as the judges felt obli-
gated to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning and rule that the Act did not apply to employers
engaged in production. For more on the Guffey Act and decision, see DUBOFSKY, supra note 6,
at 132, 142.
209. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936). Even more
worrisome to the Board was that the Texas & N.O.R. case was submitted as part of the govern-
ment's brief in defense of the Guffey Act.
210. Hutcheson, supra note 2.
211. HUTCHESON, supra note 176, at 21.
212. Id.; Hutcheson, supra note 2.
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tutional authority to intervene in the collective bargaining process or
between employers and employees. In NLRB v. Whittier Mills, for
example, the Fifth Circuit, through Judge Hutcheson, ruled that the
employer had not refused to bargain with the union.213 On the con-
trary, wrote Judge Hutcheson, the employer had engaged in good faith
collective bargaining that broke down because "each bargainer was
endeavoring to get into the agreement the things he wanted. "214
The Act, Hutcheson declared, only requires "good faith bargaining
with the purpose of reaching an agreement," but "does not require
that any particular form of agreement be reached.""'
For Judge Hutcheson, collective bargaining was essentially a pri-
vate affair between the two parties at the center of the employment
relationship.2 6 Consequently, neither the Board nor the courts could
"prescribe what shall be written" in the final contract or "interfere in
the negotiations as long as they are in good faith, going on. "217 The
Fifth Circuit allowed the Board to protect workers during the organ-
izational process, but once organized, both Hutcheson and Sibley
restricted any further interference by the Board in the employment
relationship.218
Judge Hutcheson's hesitation to allow the Board to interfere in
the employment relationship was shared by his fellow jurist on the
bench, Judge Sibley. Judge Sibley's opinions illuminate his belief that
the employment relationship was essentially a private relationship not
open to far-reaching public regulation. Unlike Hutcheson, however,
Sibley's opinions were not grounded in legal realist reasoning. On the
contrary, Judge Sibley appears quite rooted to the laissez faire, classi-
cal legal reasoning of the late nineteenth century in regards to labor
matters. Yet, the differing legal philosophies held by Judges Hutche-
son and Sibley led them to similar conclusions when ruling on NLRB
cases. While Hutcheson proved relatively more friendly to the Board
213. See NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1941).
214. Id. at 727.
215. Id. at 728.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. In a decision written by Judge Sibley, the Fifth Circuit took an even more restrictive
view of the Board's powers to intervene in the collective bargaining process. In Globe Cotton
Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939), the court overturned the NLRB's finding that the
employer refused to bargain in good faith, ruling that the company's refusal to bargain about
"legislative policies" did not violate the Act's good-faith bargaining provisions. 103 F.2d at 94.
Seniority rights, the dues check-off, and child labor, then, were removed from the collective bar-
gaining table in the Fifth Circuit. Moreover, Sibley's ruling also permitted the company to not
even offer the union a counter-proposal if it is "apparent that what the one party would thus offer
is wholly unacceptable to the other." Id.
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overall than did Sibley, both used their powers to shield the employ-
ment relationship from intrusive Board interventions.
2. Judge Sibley and Legal Conceptualism
Judge Sibley wrote the opinion in Globe Cotton Mills.219 Sibley,
unlike Hutcheson, refused to adopt even the most minimal of realist
principles. A small businessman himself, Judge Sibley owned and
operated a small knitting mill until 1901, as well as a bank and a brick
manufacturing company, in his home town of Union Point, Geor-
gia.220 Sibley empathized with the small employer facing the specter of
government regulation over the running of his business and private
property. In a 1920 commencement address at the University of
Georgia, Sibley warned that "the institution of private property is in
peril" from "legislative and executive power. "221 Sibley described to
the audience how the federal government, with the willing aid of the
judiciary, was in essence conspiratorially undermining the very foun-
dations of the republic. 22 The federal government was doing this not
through revolutionary means, but through the established democratic
and legislative process. 223 These developments were contrary to the
"object of government," Judge Sibley declared, which is the "protec-
tion of property rights" and the individual's "free exercise of this
right ... with the least interference by public law., 224 Judge Sibley's
lack of realist principles supported his strong belief in the separation of
powers, for it was the role of the judiciary to safeguard traditional con-
stitutional protections and rights. Among these protected rights were
the protection of private property rights and the ability of the individ-
ual to use that property or enter into contracts with others free from
undue government regulation.
219. Id.
220. NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 212 (1972).
221. Samuel Sibley, The Insecurity of Private Property, XXIII BULLETIN OF THE U. OF
GA., n.10, 1, 7 (1923).
222. Id.
223. Sibley viewed the progressive income tax as "not only a way of raising money, but also
an effective though indirect way of equalizing wealth, that may go far towards realizing one of
the aims of the Communists." Id. He also watched with growing alarm the increasing govern-
ment regulation of businesses "affected with the public interest." Id. He also cited the 13th and
19th amendments to the Constitution as proof for the "march of federal power" over traditional
individual and private property rights." Id.
224. Sibley, supra note 221, at 1.
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B. The Fifth Circuit in Action: Separation of Powers and Relationship
Between Employer and Employee
Two issues were of paramount importance in the Fifth Circuit in
cases involving the National Labor Relations Act: the constitutional
separation of powers and the sanctity of the relationship between
employer and employee. The Eighth Circuit believed the Board
should be essentially left alone in its enforcement of the Act; the
courts should interfere as little as possible. The judges in the Fifth
Circuit, however, distrusted administrative agencies such as the
Board, and through its Wagner Act decisions the court reasserted the
central role of the judiciary in the field of labor relations. To Hutche-
son, Sibley, and the other jurists on the bench, the courts were not
mere rubber stamps for Board decisions. Rather, they occupied a con-
stitutionally-based position to make sure the Board did not stray
beyond its statutory powers or infringe upon constitutional restric-
tions.
The judges in the Fifth Circuit also differed from those in the
Eighth Circuit with their reluctance to open the employment relation-
ship to greater public regulation. As mentioned before, the Eighth
Circuit allowed the Board to intervene in the collective bargaining
process once workers successfully organized. It forbade employers
from refusing to negotiate over nearly any item affecting the employ-
ment relationship. The judges in the Fifth Circuit, however, through
their labor decisions, worked to limit the Board's interference in the
relationship between employer and employee. This relationship, they
believed, was still essentially private in nature and not open to exten-
sive regulation by the NLRB.
1. The Fifth Circuit Enforced the Concept of Separation of Powers
The legal realism of judges like Hutcheson, though open to an
evolving and changing law, still rested upon a set of "first principles"
not amenable to change." 5 Among the most basic of these funda-
mental legal principles was the constitutional separation of powers
among the three branches of government and the subordination of
administrative agencies to the rule of law. 6 In fact, when Hutcheson
later wrote for the majority in NLRB v. Bell Oil, he emphasized that
"the function of the courts in the operation of the act is by no means
perfunctory. Upon them rests the final judicial responsibility, from
them emanates the sole authority, for making the Board's orders coer-
225. HUTCHESON, supra note 176, at 13.
226. See Hutcheson, supra note 2.
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cively effective. ' 27 The court in Bell Oil & Gas further held that the
courts are bound to accept Board decisions only "as to its fact findings,
when they are supported by the evidence...."22
Judges in the Fifth Circuit adopted an activist role for the judici-
ary and law within the new labor relations system. The primary dif-
ferences between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits were that the "legal
technicalities" and jurisdictional issues so easily overlooked by the
judges in the Eighth Circuit served as a springboard in the Fifth Cir-
cuit for extensive judicial efforts to limit the impact of the new labor
legislation on the existing social order. These "legal technicalities," in
the minds of judges like Hutcheson, were the last line of defense
against the growing administrative state's efforts to undermine the
American form of governance.229
Thus, unlike the judges in the Eighth Circuit who granted the
board free reign to best "effectuate the policies of the Act,, 230 judges in
the Fifth Circuit regularly exercised their powers of review to overturn
Board rulings. 23 1 While some believe, Hutcheson asserted, "that the
Congress in enacting this legislation, was more concerned with...
getting questions decided, than with getting them justly decided, the
whole structure of the act as well as the whole course of informed judi-
cial decision under it, makes it plain that this is not so." '232 Hutcheson
argued that the courts were merely performing their constitutional
duty when reviewing actions of the Board, and "nothing in... the
long struggle of English speaking people against the arbitrary and des-
potic exercise by Governments of seated power" supported the notion
that the judiciary should defer to administrative bodies such as the
Board.233
2. Fifth Circuit Viewed the Relationship Between Employee and
Employer as Private
Hutcheson and the Fifth Circuit also refused to accept the more
radical notions concerning the public verses private nature of the
employment relationship adopted by the judges in the Eighth Cir-
227. NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas, 91 F.2d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 1937)
228. Id.
229. See NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1939).
230. NLRB v. C. Nelson Mfg., 120 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1941).
231. See, e.g., Bell Oil & Gas, 91 F.2d 509.
232. Magnolia Petroleum v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1940).
233. Id. at 548. Also, in 1938 Hutcheson wrote that "there is no place in our constitutional
system for the exercise of arbitrary power; the arbitrary power and the rule of the constitution
cannot both exist; they are antagonistic and incompatible forces, and one or the other must of
necessity prevail whenever they are brought into conflict." See HUTCHESON, supra note 175, at
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cuit.234 In contrast to the Eighth Circuit perspective, the Fifth Circuit
believed that the employment relationship was a private, contractual
relationship between two individuals-the employer and employee.
Therefore, the power of the Board to regulate this relationship
extended solely to the protection of workers' rights to organize. Once
assured that the workers had organized and selected bargaining repre-
sentatives free from employer interference, the judges in the Fifth Cir-
cuit argued, the Board's jurisdiction in the matter ended and the
relationship again reentered the private sphere.236
The issue of the extent of the Board's power to intervene in the
employment relationship is illustrated by the case of Globe Cotton
Mills. 237 The company in Globe Cotton Mills asked the Fifth Circuit to
overturn a Board ruling requiring it to bargain collectively with its
employees. 238  Attorneys for the company argued that the employer
had bargained in good faith with the chosen representatives of its
workers but found after months of fruitless discussions that "there did
not seem to be any basis for an agreement ... in the present business
conditions., 239 Only after the negotiations came to a standstill did the
company end the negotiations with the union.24 The union then went
to the Board, claiming that the employer had violated the National
Labor Relations Act.241
The court, however, overturned the Board's ruling that the com-
pany violated the Act by not engaging in good-faith bargaining.
242
The court wrote that the company's refusal to bargain about "legisla-
tive policies," issues such as seniority rights, dues check off, and ban-
ning child labor at the plant, which were outside of the Act's
234. See, e.g., Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
235. The Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, opened up the employment relationship to a
wider degree of regulation by the Board. See Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir.
1940), Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940).
236. NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1941); Globe Cotton Mills v.
NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
237. Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939).
238. Id. at 93.
239. Id. at 94.
240. Id. at 93-94. The main issues of contention between the union and the employer
appear to be a 15% pay raise and a shortening of the work week from fifty to forty hours (which
the company said it could not afford), seniority rights (which the company said it did not want to
bind itself to), and the banning of child labor in the mill (which the company said was already
illegal under Georgia law). Id. at 93. As the negotiations stalled, the union also asked for a dues
check off-which was vehemently rejected by the company. Id. After the union requested the
dues check off and increased its demand to 25% for a pay increase the company broke off nego-
tiations and refused to offer a counterproposal-even though one was specifically requested by
the union. Id.
241. Id. at 94.
242. Id. at 95.
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definition of what constituted "the subject matter of collective bar-
gaining," did not violate the Wagner Act's good-faith bargaining pro-
visions.243 The court held that the company only had an obligation to
bargain over rates of pay, hours of employment, "or other conditions
of employment," and was not bound to offer a counterproposal where
it was "apparent that what the one party would thus offer is totally
unacceptable to the other." '44 However, the Fifth Circuit agreed that
the company should have offered a counterproposal when asked, so as
to abide by the spirit of the Wagner Act.24
3. Hostility Toward the Board: Multiple Bargaining Units,
Deprivation of Property, and Social Reform
The Fifth Circuit also refused to support the Board's efforts, as
the court saw it, to organize workers for the CIO. While the judges in
the Eighth Circuit allowed the Board to craft multiplant bargaining
units that overrode the wishes of the workers involved, the judges in
the Fifth Circuit, more often than not, took the side of the independ-
ent union and ruled against the labor board. For example, in Magno-
lia Petroleum Co., the Fifth Circuit ruled against the Board's order
calling for the disestablishment of an unaffiliated union because it had
been organized with help from and dominated by the employer.246
Judge Hutcheson blasted the Board for its lack of evidence of an unfair
labor practice and accused the agency of acting as a sponsor for the
CIO.247 "[T]his proceeding," he wrote, "takes its spring from long
continued and unsuccessful efforts of a nationally affiliated labor
union to organize... workers in a plant which has.., a local unaffili-ated labor organization. '24 "Here, as in all the similar cases," he
continued, "the national union makes and the Board sponsors the
charge that the local unaffiliated union is not the result of self-organi-
zation. "249
Thus, while the Eighth Circuit focused on the Act's preamble,
which focused on the inequality of bargaining power between workers
and their employers, the Fifth Circuit placed more emphasis on the
Act's protection of workers' rights to self-organization.50 The Act,
Judge Hutcheson argued, "nowhere provides.., that preference by
243. Id. at 94.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1940).
247. Id. at 552.
248. Id. at 546.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 552.
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employees for an unaffiliated ... organization, raises a presumption
that this preference was coerced or brought by the employer. ',' The
NLRA, he continued, "goes on exactly the contrary presumption, that
employees have the intelligence ... requisite for self-organization,
either by joining an existing labor organization or forming one of their
own. "252
The concern expressed by the Fifth Circuit over the erosion of
fundamental constitutional principles and division of society along
permanent class lines provides another clue to the court's hostility
toward the Board: the Fifth Circuit judges believed Board decisions
deprived employers of property. "A fundamental tenet of liberal
democracy" declared Hutcheson, "is the right of free men to...
acquire, to own, and to hold property, and not to be deprived of it
except by due process of law. '253 Judge Sibley also believed that the
basic role of democratic government was to protect traditional prop-
erty rights.254 In addition, Sibley warned against judicial or legislative
recognition "of the division of our citizenry into classes, irreconcilably
opposed in interest or aim. '' 21' As judge Sibley's opinions reflect, the
NLRB, however, violated traditional property rights through its
interference in private businesses, and attempted to divide the nation
into two classes by pushing workers into nationally affiliated unions.256
251. Id. at 549-50.
252. Id. at 550. The Eighth Circuit, however, offered a contrary opinion in its Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. decision, 113 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1940), holding that it was up to the Board to
determine the correct bargaining unit and representatives of the workers so as to best augment
their bargaining power. Hutcheson also chastised the Board in NLRB v. Riverside Mfg. Co.,
119 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1941). In this case the CIO was attempting to organize a small cotton
mill in Georgia. Id. at 303. The court ruled that the evidence showed that the workers did not
want to be represented by the CIO-affiliated union. Id. at 305-06. The court attacked the Board
for what it saw as its organizational efforts for the union and viewed the worker as caught
between their employers, who did not want any union, and the "efforts of the national union,
assisted by the Board in its administrative capacity, to organize and represent him willynilly ......
Id. at 304. The court even excused the actions of a group of workers who physically drove pro-
union supporters out of the factory, for "these employees took the action they did because they
felt that the union with the assistance of the Board was trying to force upon them the
representation they did not want." Id. at 306.
253. HUTCHESON, supra note 176, at 175.
254. Id.
255. Sibley, supra note 221.
256. The Fifth Circuit's focus on protecting the rights of workers to organize rather than
on equalizing bargaining power meshes well with the legal philosophy of Sibley and Hutcheson.
Neither judge denied that workers had a right to organize. Judge Hutcheson made this belief
clear in his 1928 opinion in the Texas & N.O.R. case discussed earlier, and none of Judge Sib-
ley's opinions argue that workers should not be allowed to organize freely from employer coer-
cion. What they objected to was what they viewed as the Board's arrogant efforts to dismiss the
wishes and desires of workers by pushing them into the C.I.O., believing that such affiliation
would offer workers greater bargaining power. Hutcheson and Sibley believed the purpose of the
Board and the Act was to protect workers who wished to organize or join any labor organization
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V. CONCLUSION
Judicial criticisms of New Deal social reforms, specifically the
NLRB, did not reflect a complete rejection of legal realist principles or
reasoning. On the contrary, judges such as Hutcheson, "cherished as
much as any 'the glorious uncertainty,' the iridescent beauty, of a
changing law. 2 7 The primary difference, however, with Hutcheson's
realism on the Fifth Circuit, as compared to that of the judges in the
Eighth Circuit, was that Hutcheson advocated an evolving law not for
social reform or in support of the New Deal administrative state, but
rather to preserve fundamental constitutional principles from subver-
sive social, economic, and political forces such as administrative agen-
cies. 2 8 The "growing tendency of even ruggedly individualistic
Americans... to look to, to lean on government instead of upon
themselves," declared Hutcheson, "is growing apace. 259 The rise of
the New Deal administrative state raised fears among many in the
judiciary that the nation had begun taking the form of the dictatorial
states dominating Europe during the mid-1 930s and that it had eroded
such traditional American values as self-reliance. Instead of serving as
a "liberator," ideological forces in those nations had transformed law
into a "master" .26 The nation's only hope of avoiding this fate, Judge
Hutcheson argued, rested in the protection of the "first principles"
enshrined in the Constitution, of which the most important were
property and individual rights, as well as the separation of powers.261
In some sense, then, the legal realists and conceptualist-realists
on the circuit court benches did not differ substantially in their use of
the law. The realists of the Eighth Circuit actively employed law to
further the NLRB's efforts at enforcing the Wagner Act. The judges
sitting in the Fifth Circuit used the law just as aggressively to limit the
Board's impact on the employment relationship. The battling benches
did differ, however, in their visions of the post-Depression social
they wished. The Act's purpose was not to make the Board an active agent of social change with
the aim of building up the powers of workers by forcing them into nationally affiliated unions.
Hutcheson makes these charges against the Board in NLRB v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 119 F.2d 302
(5th Cir. 1941).
257. HUTCHESON, supra note 176, at 22.
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id. at 7.
260. HUTCHESON, supra note 176, at 8.
261. Id. at 10. It should be noted that I am not arguing that the Eighth Circuit or New
Dealers advocated the destruction of property or individual rights. The judges in the Eighth
Circuit did, however, support extensive federal regulation of those rights when it came to the
Wagner Act. This is especially true in cases where private property rights conflicted with the
expressed public interest of the Act to protect workers' rights to organize and prevent interrup-
tions in interstate commerce.
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order. The activist judges in the Eighth Circuit applied the law in the
labor board cases to transform the existing power relations between
workers and employers. The Eighth Circuit also fully accepted the
New Deal administrative state and the notion that administrative
agencies would occupy an important place in the post-New Deal form
of American governance. This group of judges was willing to relin-
quish some of its judicial prerogatives to make room for these new
instruments of public power. The judges in the Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, seeing a world divided by ideologically driven and highly
administrative states where law had ceased to function as a form of
liberation, were not yet ready to abandon their posts as guardians of
traditional constitutional safeguards. These judges believed that
property rights and the separation of powers were at the heart of the
American system, and they were not willing to cede their constitution-
ally derived powers to administrative-adjudicative bodies that sub-
verted these very ideals.
The battles on the Eighth and Fifth Circuit benches over the
Wagner Act reflected two competing notions of the role law should
play in labor relations. Through their decisions in labor board cases,
the judges in the Eighth Circuit asserted that law needed to be
brought back in touch with the social and economic conditions of the
1930s. Consequently, the judges in this court deferred to the Board's
aggressive enforcement of the Act, even when in doubt as to the
agency's case, and supported the administrative process in the field of
labor relations. This group of judges fully subscribed to James Lan-
dis' belief that administrative agencies were far superior to the judici-
ary when dealing with problems arising within clearly defined boun-
daries, such as labor, agriculture, or the stock market. Courts, unlike
administrative agencies, Landis asserted, "were jacks of all trades and
masters of none," '262 and the turn to the administrative process,
especially in the field of labor relations "was resorted to ... in the
hope that it would buttress the legislative will to turn the existing
current of judicial decision. "263 The judges in the Eighth Circuit
allowed the NLRB nearly free reign to fulfill its statutory mandate and
rarely exercised their powers of review over the labor agency. Judicial
deference in the Eighth Circuit resulted in greater effectiveness of the
labor legislation within this jurisdiction.
Unlike the judges in the Eighth Circuit, the judges in the Fifth
Circuit believed the judiciary still occupied an important role in the
American form of governance and in the labor relations system con-
262. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 215 (quoting Landis).
263. LANDIS, supra note 58, at 98.
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structed by the Wagner Act. Their position was made all the more
important in the face of a growing body of administrative agencies
such as the NLRB. The NLRB interfered with traditional property
rights and, more importantly, violated the constitutional doctrine of
the separation of powers, which, as one critic of the New Deal
asserted, was the only way of "preserving representative government,
without which democracy cannot exist." '264 Thus, though some of the
judges in the Fifth Circuit were also advocates of a growing law, the
rise of powerful administrative agencies led them to reassert that
change must occur within the framework provided by the United
States Constitution. The judges in this circuit, then, did not defer to
the Board's aggressive enforcement of the Act. Rather, this group of
circuit court judges readily employed the power of judicial review to
overturn Board orders that they believed were either unsupported by
the evidence or beyond the scope of the agency's constitutional and
statutory authority.
264. C. Perry Patterson, Judicial Review as a Safeguard to Democracy, 29 GEO. L.J. 829,
847 n.7 (1941).
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